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ABSTRACT 
China’s rapid growth and success in poverty reduction over the last three decades has inspired 
world-wide admiration.  This paper uses a simple framework with a Kaleckian flavor to analyze 
structural developments in the Chinese economy, and to understand some of the distributional 
consequences.  Some of the possible sources of these distributional developments are then further 
analyzed using a trade-theoretic approach.  Other aspects of China’s investment- and export-led 
growth strategy are discussed along with the problems that the focused pursuit of such a strategy 
has raised.  We conclude that China’s growth model may now have outlived its utility, both on 
economic and socio-political grounds. 
 
1. Introduction and Background 
The fact that over the last three decades China has grown at an average annual rate exceeding 
nine percent is widely known and admired.  Moreover, growth has been accompanied by a sharp 
reduction in country-wide poverty numbers.i  What is less frequently recognized, however, is that 
the trajectory of China’s breakneck growth has created social, political and economic problems 
that, if not corrected soon, are likely to impede or even undermine the underpinnings of Chinese 
growth in the coming years.  This paper discusses some of the constraints on Chinese growth that 
are beginning to assume ominous proportions.  Our focus mainly is on growing (internal and 
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external) constraints and the role that the current investment- and export-led growth model plays 
in exacerbating them.   
In the years following the Tiananmen Square events in 1989, the Chinese regime carried out an 
extensive review of its social and economic policies.ii  One of the major changes that the regime 
sought to implement as part of a major round of reforms over the period 1992-97 was to attempt 
to quicken the pace of economic growth, capital accumulation, and employment creation.  A 
major policy objective since then has been to rapidly create jobs for the millions of workers of 
potential migrants from the rural areas.  Perhaps calculating that its internal market was not large 
enough to rely on, the Chinese government made well-coordinated efforts to attract export-
oriented foreign direct investment (FDI).  Figure 1 shows the dramatic increase in FDI in the 
early nineties.  The figure also shows the evolution of the various components of demand as a 
proportion of GDP.  Investment and exports have grown dramatically, displacing household 
consumption in the process.  Government spending, on the other hand, has remained more or less 
stable.  The contribution of investment to Chinese growth is obvious.  However, the contribution 
of exports is less so, since total income or GDP is a function of net exports.  Not surprisingly, 
especially given the vertically integrated nature of Chinese exports (see more on this below), 
Chinese imports have also grown rapidly since the beginning of economic reforms.  A better 
measure of the direct contribution of exports -- a measure that ignores the indirect contribution of 
exports via investment) of exports – is, therefore, the trade balance.  Figure 2 demonstrates that 
the contribution of net external spending has grown significantly in recent years, after a decline in 
the mid-nineties.iii   
Export-oriented policies require shifting relative prices towards tradables, and within tradables 
towards exportables.  In pursuit of the former objective, China’s growth strategy has involved 
maintaining a ``low’’ real and nominal exchange rate through keeping the renminbi loosely 
pegged to the US dollar.iv  The second objective, that is shifting production towards exportables, 
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has also been pursued methodically.  The government has subsidized and favored export-oriented 
investment, especially at the local level, partly through the incentives created by the system that 
guides promotion of local officials and the tax system, including the production-based value 
added tax (Kuijs and Wang, 2005).  Beginning in 1992, the government reduced tariffs in a series 
of adjustments (see Branstetter and Lardy, 2006).  This was followed by the merging of the 
official and trading market exchange rates under a regime of managed floating after a big one-
step devaluation in 1994.  
China’s strategy is reminiscent in many ways of that pursued by the East Asian ``tigers’’ during 
their long phases of accelerated growth.  However, there are some important differences, both in 
the processes and outcomes.  For example, South Korea and Taiwan were much less reliant on 
external sources of investment.  Moreover, expansion of exports in these countries was much less 
contingent on the kinds of vertically integrated international production networks that China has 
relied on to create an industrialized export base.  The restructuring of the expenditure 
composition of GDP was much less dramatic in these countries.  As we seek to demonstrate, 
these features of the Chinese economy have contributed to entrenching patterns of ``uneven 
growth.’’  Finally, China is much larger in an economic sense, which means that its current 
growth pattern could have potentially negative effects on the purchasing power of its citizens as 
well as those of competing developing countries in the coming years.   
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 develops a simple Kaleckian 
framework to analyze the role of savings in an investment- and export-led growth regime.  
Section 3 uses this framework to analyze a few key macroeconomic aspects of the Chinese 
growth pattern, focusing on how these combine with microeconomic, trade-related considerations 
to facilitate uneven growth in terms of income distribution.  Sections 4 and 5 explain how policies 
associated with export-led growth can lead to misallocation of scarce resources.  Section 6 
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extends the discussion to shed some light on ways in which China’s growth trajectory has left it 
exposed to developments outside its borders.  Section 7 concludes. 
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Figure 1: The evolution of expenditures and FDI.  C denotes final consumption expenditure, I 
denotes gross capital formation, G denotes general government final consumption expenditure, 
TB denotes the external balance in goods and services, while X denotes exports. All variables 
expressed as percentages of GDP.  Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 
2. A Key Element: The Decline in Consumption as a 
Proportion of GDP 
The pursuit of investment and export-led growth based on high (domestic and imported) private 
savings often requires constraining the growth of domestic consumption expenditures.  A 
frequently used identity illustrates this point.  The expenditures approach defines gross national 
product (GNP) as: 
Y ≡ C + I + G + TB + NFI       (1) 
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where Y, C, I, G, TB, and NFI represent income, consumption, government spending, the trade 
balance, and net foreign factor income, respectively, all variables being expressed in real terms.  
Since the current account (CA) equals net exports of goods and services plus net foreign factor 
income, 
Y ≡ C + I + G + CA        (1A) 
where CA ≡ TB + NFI.  But (after-tax) disposable national income can either be saved or 
consumed.  That is, 
Y - T ≡ C + S          (2) 
The latter two identities taken together imply that: 
CA = (T – G) + (S – I)       (3) 
Put in words, a trade surplus reflects an excess of national (public and private) savings over 
investment.v  Intuitively, a country running a current account surplus must export savings to the 
rest of the world in order for the latter to pay for their CA deficit.  Another way to re-arrange 
(1A) may provide further perspective: 
Y ≡ E + CA         (4) 
where E = C + I + G represents domestic absorption or expenditures.  Or,  
CA ≡ Y - E         (4A) 
In other words, a current account surplus reflects an excess of income over expenditures (the 
Chinese case in recent years).  Conversely, a current account deficit reflects an excess of 
expenditures over income (the US case in recent decades).   
In recent years, China has experienced savings and investment rates that are unprecedented even 
when compared against the standards set by the neighboring East Asian tigers (Taiwan, South 
Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore).  Interestingly, true as this is on the investment side, it is even 
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truer on the savings side, as reflected recently in growing current account surpluses.  Figures 2 
and 3 illustrate China’s exceptionally high savings and investment rates. Figure 2 presents trends 
in gross fixed capital formation as a proportion of GDP for China and seven other countries or 
groups of countries (Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Low and Middle Income 
countries, and Middle Income countries).  Japan is widely regarded as the first Asian ``tiger’’ 
while Hong Kong, Korea (Republic of). Singapore and Taiwan are the four East Asian tigers.vi  
India is comparable in size and level of development to China, and has, like the latter, been 
growing rapidly over the last two decades.  Low income countries are defined as countries with 
per capita gross national income (GNI) of less than $905, while middle income countries are 
defined as those with per capita GNI between $905 and $3,595.  As seen in the figure, none of the 
other countries or country groups, with the exception of Singapore, has ever attained the levels 
experienced by China in the last few years.  Figure 3 shows that the savings performance is, if 
anything, even more outstanding.  Moreover, Chinese saving and investment rates began a steep 
upward incline in 2002 which continues to date.   
Figure 4 illustrates the issue from a different angle.  The trajectories of national investment and 
savings change and evolve over time, as does the path of output growth. It makes more sense, 
therefore, to compare different economies at comparable phases of their growth trajectories.  We 
attempt to do this by identifying the fastest growing decades for the relevant countries in terms of 
per capita GDP growth.  We then average the values of the variables of interest for the decade 
and plot them along with the average values of the same variables for China over the most recent 
decade.  The fastest growing decades were identified as follows: Hong Kong, 1961-70; Japan, 
1961-70; India, 1997-2006; Korea, 1982-1991, Singapore, 1965-1974.   
Again, the figure clearly highlights the exceptionally skewed nature of the Chinese growth pattern 
in the most recent decade.  Chinese household consumption has been a lower share of GDP then 
even the other East Asian tigers during their rapid growth and accumulation phases.  For 
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example, Korea had an average consumption-to-GDP share during their most rapid growth phase 
that is 12 percentage points higher than the corresponding Chinese share over the recent decade.  
The closest comparison along this dimension is with Japan in its highest growth phase in the 
1960s, but even in this case the difference is more than 9 percentage points.  China also stands out 
in the investment share of GDP, with the closest comparison being with Japan (almost 37 percent 
for China versus almost 33 percent for Japan).  Similarly, the Chinese savings rate has been 
exceptionally high, with the nearest competitor being Japan (with a 6 percentage point 
difference).  Finally, these differences are also reflected in the trade balance in goods and services 
-- which has been positive and exceptionally high for China -- and in the relatively low Chinese 
national expenditure share of GDP.  The latter statistic underlies the oft-repeated statement that 
China has kept its living standards lower than justified by its income level. 
The question of what is causing the growing current account surpluses is related to the question of 
what facilitates a growth pattern consisting of exceptionally low consumption, high investment, 
and even higher savings.  This is the question that we turn to next.   
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Figure 2: Gross fixed capital formation as a proportion of GDP (1978-2005). 
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 Figure 3: Gross savings as a proportion of GDP (1978-2005). 
   
 
10
1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002
20
30
40
50
Middle income
Low & middle income
Japan
India
Singapore
Korea, Rep.
Hong Kong, China
China
8
 
Figure 4: Averaged values of variables (expressed as percentages of GDP) over the fastest growing decade for each country.  C_h denotes 
household final consumption expenditure, I denotes gross fixed capital formation, G denotes general government final consumption expenditure, 
TB denotes the external balance in goods and services, S denotes gross domestic savings, while E denotes gross national expenditure. Source: 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
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 The high Chinese saving rate is frequently attributed to cultural factors, unique to East Asia in 
general and China in particular, that are reflected in the higher propensity of households in these 
countries to save.  While this may undoubtedly be true to some extent, recent research has 
rendered this explanation increasingly questionable.  Firstly, while the Chinese household saving 
rate is high, it is not radically different from that of other developing countries in Asia.  For 
example, India has had a higher household saving rate in recent years (Kuijs, 2006).  Secondly, 
Kuijs (2005a) finds that the factor separating China from other high saving developing countries 
is the high rate of savings by the government and enterprises.vii  Since these enterprises are not 
legally obligated or expected to pay out part of their profits in the form of dividends, these are 
able to channel retained earnings into fixed investments at high rates.  Moreover, Kuijs (2005a) 
and Aziz (2007) find that profit margins have expanded in recent years (perhaps partly reflecting 
China’s move into sectors that produce more technologically sophisticated products), providing 
even more room for the high retained earnings - high investment nexus to come into play.  Finally 
Kuijs reports that another major reason for high enterprise savings has been the high share of 
capital intensive industry in GDP. 
This discussion can be linked to broader political economy considerations through Kaleckian 
channels.  National income can be expressed in yet another way as follows: 
Y ≡ W + R + T         (5) 
where W and R denote total (after-tax) national wages and profits.  Decomposing domestic 
consumption into workers’ and capitalists’ consumption, CW and CR, respectively, allows us to re-
write equation 1(A) as: 
Y ≡ CW + CR + I + G + CA        (6) 
Or, 
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CA  = (W – CW) + (R - CR) - I + (T - G)      (6A) 
Kalecki assumed that workers do not save.viii  Further assuming, for simplicity, a balanced budget 
yields: 
CA  =  sR R – I         (7) 
where sR denotes the rate of savings out of profit income. It may be more convenient to express 
this relationship in terms of GNP.  Dividing both sides by Y, defining the share of profit as π, and 
using lower case letters to indicate that the current account and investment variables are being 
expressed as proportions of GNP yields:ix
ca  =  sR π  – i          (8) 
Equation (8) tells us that the higher the share of profits in national income, the higher the 
magnitude of national savings and the higher the rate of investment that can be sustained while 
maintaining a balanced current account.  Alternatively, the higher the share of profits in national 
income, the higher the national savings and the higher the current account surplus that can be 
sustained at a given proportion of investment.   
One of the widely recognized facts about recent Chinese economic history is the shift of income 
from wages to profits, as reflected in the national income shares of each group.  According to 
World Bank (2007), for example, the share of wages in GDP declined from 53 percent in 1998 to 
41.4 percent in 2005.  The lower wages have corresponded with a declining trend in the 
consumption share of GDP (see Figure 5).  In light of equation (8), this feature of the Chinese 
growth model has enabled China to rely on external demand and investment to generate high 
growth rates while maintaining low consumption and current account surpluses.  Noting that 
Chinese investment in recent years has been driven mainly by manufactures, real estate, and 
infrastructure, Barnett and Brooks (2006) find that manufacturing investment is significantly 
correlated with retained earnings.  They also find that the capital-output ratio has increased, and 
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the marginal product of capital has declined since around 1993.  This pattern of increasing 
capital-output ratios raises important concerns about the sustainability of recent growth patterns.  
For example, based on their estimate that it would require the investment-to-GDP ratio reaching 
unprecedented high levels of 55 percent on average in 2014-24 in order to maintain an annual 
GDP growth of 8 percent, Kuijs and Wang (2005) conclude that continued investment and 
industry-led growth in the scenario on current policies is almost certainly unsustainable.  
Furthermore, as discussed in the next section, this growth path has led to the exacerbation of 
distributional inequities, which may undermine China’s long-run economic prospects. 
 
Figure 5: The evolution of private consumption and the wage share of GDP.  Source: World Bank 
(p. 6, 2007) 
 
3. Uneven growth 
3.1 Macroeconomic Aspects 
According to Chaudhuri and Ravallion (2006), the unevenness of Chinese growth is characterized 
by at least three characteristics: 
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• Unevenness across households, with the incomes of the richest households growing much 
faster than those at the bottom of the income distribution, giving rise to dramatically 
increased between-household inequality. 
• Unevenness across provinces with the inland provinces lagging behind the coastal 
provinces. 
• Unevenness across sectors, with the primary sector (agriculture) lagging behind the 
secondary (industrial) and tertiary (service) sectors, and the rural areas lagging behind the 
urban areas. 
To analyze the unevenness in outcomes across households, it is convenient to look at a related 
manifestation of growing polarization, that between the share of profits and wages.  As noted 
earlier, the national share of wages has been on the decline over the last three decades.  We can 
again employ some basic accounting identities to guide our discussion.  Rearranging equation (6): 
Y ≡ (1 - sW) W + (1 - sR) R + I + G + CA      (6B) 
Again, assuming for simplicity that workers do not save, (6B) becomes: 
Y ≡  W + (1 - sR) R + I + G + CA       (6C) 
Thus, due to workers’ higher propensity to consume, an increase in wages has a much greater 
proportional impact on aggregate demand from domestic sources than an increase in profits.x  
This means that a growth strategy based on domestic demand will be likely to focus on ensuring 
that the share of wages in national income does not decline.  This provides an interesting contrast 
to equations (7) and (8), which imply that a growth strategy based on external demand (as 
manifested in current account surpluses) and investment is likely to focus on maintaining or 
raising the profit share of national income. 
There is another (related) factor that suggests that an outward-oriented strategy would be at best 
less focused on, and at worst, opposed to taking direct measures to ensure more egalitarian 
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patterns of growth.  For an outward-oriented strategy that relies on boosting the competitiveness 
of domestically produced tradables, wages that rise at a rate slower than the growth rate of labor 
productivity mean falling unit labor costs and hence increased sales (in the case of imperfect 
product market competition) and/or higher profit rates.  Existing evidence from China suggests 
that while wages have been rising rapidly, at least in the urban east coast areas, productivity 
growth has been even higher.xi  Reliance on external sources of demand has lessened the obvious 
economic rationale for reversing this trend.  However, the resulting polarization may have serious 
socio-economic consequences in the long run, especially if job creation stalls. 
Turning to one of the other dimensions along which Chinese growth has been uneven, the eastern 
and southeastern coastal provinces have been the greatest beneficiaries of the post-1978 economic 
regime.  For example, according to Chaudhuri and Ravallion (2006), Chinese provincial rates of 
GDP growth ranged from a low of 5.9 percent in Qinghai to a high of 13.3 percent in Zhejiang 
between 1978 and 2004.  One obvious reason for this polarization between coastal and inland 
regions is the heavy public investment in infrastructure  that took place in the former due to their 
geographical proximity to the dynamic east Asian region (especially Hong Kong), and the 
subsequent arrival of domestic and foreign private investment.  A related reason is the differential 
tax treatment afforded to investors in these areas.  Yet another important factor is the 
geographical proximity of these regions to important trade nodes, and their resulting pivotal 
position in the existing growth model.  A consequence has been, according to an empirical study 
by Wan et al. (2007) that uneven distributions of domestic capital, FDI and trade account for 
almost 50 percent of total regional inequality.  
Finally, following the example of many other developing Asian and Latin American countries, 
the Chinese development model has placed a particular emphasis on moving resources from the 
rural agricultural sector to the urban secondary and tertiary sectors.xii  For example, according to 
estimates made by the People’s Bank of China (2004) small and medium-sized enterprises—
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which are significantly more prevalent in services than in industry—account for more than half of 
Chinese GDP but receive less than 10 percent of total bank loans. The government’s channeling 
of financing to investment in infrastructure has also traditionally been geared towards facilitating 
industry in particular (cited by Kuijs and Wang, 2005).   
Figure 6 illustrates the relative contraction of the agricultural sector, whose share of value-added 
in GDP declined from about 33 percent in the early 1980s to 12 percent in 2005.  This shift is also 
reflected in the share of total employment in the primary sector which declined from about 70 per 
cent in 1980 to about 50 per cent in 1997 (Bhalla and Qiu, 2002).xiii  Not surprisingly, while the 
rural areas have seen a decline in poverty, their economic growth has been limited relative to the 
urban areas.  Moreover, according to Ravallion and Chen (2007), absolute inequality (as 
measured by the difference between mean incomes) has increased appreciably, both between and 
within both urban and rural areas.xiv  In a major study, Kanbur and Zhang (1999) concluded that 
the contribution of rural-urban disparities to regional inequality in China exceeded the 
contribution of coastal-inland disparities, although the contribution of the latter has grown more 
rapidly, especially in the 1990s.xv  Wu and Perlof (Table 1, 2005) also find a steady increase in 
the urban Gini index starting around 1991 or so.  Sicular et al. (Table 1, 2007) find that the 
urban–rural income ratio was close to 3 in 2002 and cite Eastwood and Lipton (2004) to 
demonstrate that this ratio is quite high by international standards.  For example, the ratio for 
most other Asian countries lay between 1.3 and 1.8 in the nineties, with the Philippines an outlier 
at 2.17. 
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Figure 6: Share of Various Sectors in Total Value-Added (1961-2005) 
 
3.2 Microeconomic Considerations 
A major puzzle in mainstream international trade theory is the simultaneous growth of wage-
wage and profit-wage inequality in many developed and developing countries in recent years.  
Our earlier discussion suggests that there is substantial evidence that this holds true for China as 
well.  While the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework of international trade theory does 
predict a rise in inequality in capital and skilled labor abundant industrialized countries, it 
predicts the opposite for unskilled labor abundant developing countries.  The intuition is quite 
straightforward.  Given a number of simplifying assumptions,xvi a country’s comparative 
advantage in a two good, two country world will lie in producing the good that uses its abundant 
factor intensively.  In other words, a skilled labor abundant country will find its comparative 
advantage to be in the good that uses more skilled labor relative to unskilled labor when 
compared to the other good.  In the presence of perfectly competitive product and factor markets, 
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assuming full employment of all factors, and abstracting away from international factor mobility, 
when a country opens up to more trade, the increase in the relative price of its comparative 
advantage (export) good leads to a re-allocation of resources towards that sector and a consequent 
rise in the relative demand for its abundant factor.  The latter, in turn, translates into an increase 
in the returns to that factor.  Thus, opening up to trade would mean, for a skilled labor abundant 
country, an increase in the relative (and absolute) wages of its skilled labor.  An unskilled labor 
abundant developing country, on the other hand, will see its unskilled labor benefit in relative and 
absolute terms.  Making the plausible assumption that the owners of capital and highly-skilled 
workers will tend to have higher incomes than less-skilled workers, the framework would, 
therefore, predict for trade liberalization to result in increased inequality in developed countries 
and reduced inequality in developing countries.  China, however, has not experienced the trend in 
functional distribution predicted by this framework.xvii   The reasons underlying this development 
are undoubtedly complex and vary with country.  However, we limit ourselves to a few 
mechanisms that seem to be directly relevant in China’s case.   
China has pursued an aggressive privatization drive since the State Council announced its plans in 
1992 to make China a “socialist market economy.”xviii Much of the rapidly expanding private 
sector employment in China falls in the informal sector in the sense that it does not enjoy the 
labor protections that cover formal sector employees.  Add to this the reality that, in the absence 
of unemployment insurance, most working age persons in developing countries cannot remain 
unemployed for extended periods of time, even if this means working in informal, unregulated 
conditions without job security or benefits.  Razmi (2009) shows that, in a modified Heckscher-
Ohlin framework that assumes nominal wage stickiness in the formal sector, labor retrenchment 
in the public sector will lead to an expansion of the informal sector at the expense of the formal 
sector, and growing wage-wage and profit-wage inequality.   
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Another feature of China’s investment- and export-led growth model has been its rapid 
incorporation into vertically integrated global production networks.  Vertical integration, which 
has alternatively been termed “slicing the value chain,” “fragmentation,” and “production 
sharing”, refers to the geographic separation of activities involved in goods production across 
countries.  For example, the production of a good may involve research and design, 
manufacturing, assembly of components, and retail.  Typically, the first stage is undertaken in 
industrialized countries while the labor-intensive assembly stage occurs in labor-abundant 
developing countries.  China participates in global supply chains both as a net seller of 
intermediate products (for example, firms in East Asia have been importing relatively labor-
intensive intermediate products from China since the 1980’s) or as an assembler or processor of 
final products from manufactured components (for example, special economic zones (SEZs) in 
Shanghai have assembled intermediate products into final goods made for U.S. markets since the 
1980’s).   Indeed, China has become the global assembling/processing powerhouse, with 
estimates placing its processed exports between 45-55 percent of its total exports (see more on 
this aspect below). 
Feenstra (2001) shows that the trade in inputs between different countries in a vertically 
integrated production chain has an effect similar to a skill-biased technical change that increases 
demand for skilled labor.  The underlying intuition is a nuanced extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework.  The same production processes that are relatively unskilled labor intensive in 
industrialized countries may be relatively skilled labor intensive in developing countries.  For 
example, a manufacturing job that is mechanized in the US, and may therefore, require few skills 
to perform in the US may require the skills of a college degree holder in China.  Increased 
outsourcing of the relatively unskilled labor intensive processes from the US to China as part of 
global production fragmentation will, therefore, raise the relative demand for skilled labor in both 
countries, generating increased inequality within those nations. 
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Razmi (2009) suggests another mechanism driven by the phenomenon of vertical integration.  A 
significant proportion of vertically integrated export activities in developing countries takes place 
in the informal sector.  Tariff reductions for imports into a vertically integrated tradable goods 
sector make production in that sector more profitable.  In the presence of such a sector that is 
even more labor-intensive than the formal sector in a developing country, the resulting re-
allocation of resources can lead to both informalization and growing wage-wage and profit-wage 
inequality.  We have already provided evidence on growing income polarization in China.  The 
simultaneous increase in informalization is also becoming well-documented.  For example, Ghose 
(2008) reports that during 1997-2005, which is a period of growing income polarization, 
employment growth in China was entirely accounted for by non-formal and irregular 
employment, while formal employment experienced a steep decline.xix  The argument that the 
simultaneous growth of inequality and informalization in China may share a common causal 
factor in the form of heavy reliance on export-led growth raises some intriguing questions for 
future research.   
 
4. Booming investment in non-tradables and real 
estate 
As mentioned earlier, growth based on expanding trade requires shifting of resources from the 
non-tradable goods sector to the tradable goods sector.  This in turn is often achieved by raising 
the price of tradables relative to non-tradables through maintaining a low (or undervalued) 
nominal (and real) exchange rate. As mentioned earlier, this has been one of the motives 
underlying China’s rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in recent years.  However, 
the unsterilized accumulation of reserves has the side effect of increasing the money supply, and 
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making available liquidity for investment in sectors outside the tradable goods sector.  To see 
this, we turn to another commonly used identity: 
MB ≡ NDA + Res        (9) 
where MB denotes the monetary base (high-powered money), NDA denotes the banking system’s 
net domestic assets (held in the form of domestic securities), while Res denotes foreign exchange 
reserves (held in the form of foreign currency, assets, securities, etc.).  An increase in foreign 
exchange reserves thus increases a country’s monetary base.  The real estate boom in Shanghai 
and other urban areas on the east coast is partly a manifestation of pressures arising from rapid 
liquidity growth in China, which is not unconnected to the rapid expansion of the monetary base.   
On a related note, another likely consequence of the rapid liquidity creation and accompanying 
low interest rates and low cost of capital is the rise in the capital intensity of production. Indeed, 
the ICOR ratio of Chinese production has risen steadily in recent years.  According to Kuijs and 
Wang (2005), more than 90 percent of the growth in industry in 1993-2004 took the form of labor 
productivity growth rather than employment growth, mainly led by high investment and increased 
capital-labor ratio. As a result, absorption of agricultural surplus labor into the industrial (and 
mostly tradable goods) sector has been limited since the mid 1990s. This, in addition to 
informalization, at least partly explains the observed decline in the output elasticity of 
employment in the last decade.  For example, Bhalla and Qiu (2002) citing the People’s Daily 
report that while in 1980, one per cent of GDP growth rate led to an increase in employment by 
0.33 per cent, during the ninth Five Year Plan period (1996–2000), the figure dropped to 0.16 per 
cent.  Kuijs and Wang (2005) report that urban employment growth slowed from 5.4 percent per 
year during 1978-93 to 2.9 percent during 1993-2004.  Considering the immense importance of 
generating employment in a labor abundant developing country like China, and the need to 
contain social conflict by keeping unemployment and underemployment low, the reduced ability 
of investment to create new formal sector jobs becomes a source of concern for policy makers 
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and party officials.  Moreover, to the extent that slow job growth in the formal sector accelerates 
the informalization of the work force, the resulting upward pressure on inequality (see the 
previous section) raises further concerns.  
 
5. Sterilization costs low but could eventually rise 
Reverting to equation (9), a country can counter inflationary pressures arising from a rapid 
increase in the monetary base by “sterilizing” its reserve transactions.  For example, a country 
running a balance of payments surplus can sterilize the resulting increase in its monetary base by 
conducting open market operations (by selling bonds, for example).  In other words, the country’s 
central bank can reduce its net domestic assets to offset the increase in foreign exchange reserves.  
Existing literature suggests that China has been able to successfully sterilize a major portion (but 
not all) of its reserve accumulation.xx  A country that sterilizes its foreign exchange accumulation 
to prevent it from translating into an increase in the money supply can continue to maintain 
competitive exchange rates, and largely avoid the problems created by excess liquidity, at least in 
the short run.  However, successful sterilization leads to other potential problems.  First, by 
keeping interest rates relatively high, sterilization creates further pressure for capital inflows and 
external imbalances.xxi  Secondly, the bonds that the People’s Bank issues in order to sterilize 
reserve accumulation raise its interest obligations.  For a typical country that accumulates foreign 
exchange-denominated assets in the form of US treasury bills, the rise in domestic bond rates as 
sterilization proceeds,xxii and the resulting losses to the Central Bank as it issues high interest 
bearing securities while earning low interest rates, result in rising “quasi-fiscal” costs of 
sterilization.  Indications to date, however, are that China has been able to continue issuing 
sterilization bonds at low interest rates, thanks in part to the still largely state controlled banking 
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system.  However, this is likely to change as China liberalizes its banking system while 
continuing to sterilize. 
Although central bank operations are usually less than fully transparent, it is estimated that China 
holds about 70 per cent of its foreign exchange reserves in the form of dollar denominated assets 
(Roubini, 2007).  An associated problem that grows in importance as the size of China’s reserves 
increases is the potential for large capital losses as the currency eventually appreciates against the 
dollar.  To put things in perspective, China’s foreign exchange reserves are now estimated to be 
approaching 1.8 trillion dollars. Assuming a dollar component of 70 per cent implies 
approximately one trillion US dollars.  A 20-30 per cent appreciation of the dollar would 
therefore, translate into immediate capital losses to the tune of 360-540 billion dollars, or 
significantly more than 10 per cent of Chinese GDP.  While a more careful analysis would weigh 
this consideration against the possible losses from not holding reserves, this potential (and 
growing) cost of reserve accumulation cannot be ignored.  Indeed it is the rising actual and 
potential financial cost of rapid reserve accumulation that has encouraged China to increasingly 
invest in non-government securities, and recently to start a sovereign investment fund in order to 
diversify its portfolio of foreign asset holdings.xxiii  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly from a longer-run perspective, foreign exchange reserves 
(or accumulation of low interest  bearing US treasury securities) carry social opportunity costs in 
the sense that the resources could be used for more socially productive purposes such as financing 
public capital expenditure or paying down external debt and reducing the interest bill.   
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6. The Growing Threat of Protectionism (Man-Made 
and Natural) 
The trade deficit with China has been the largest bilateral component of the ever-growing US 
current account deficit in recent years. The resulting trade tensions between the US and China 
have led to some unfortunate China-bashing, especially in the US Congress, where a number of 
members have held currency manipulation and “unfair” trade practices such as export subsidies 
responsible for the increasing imbalances.  For example, in 2005, Senators Charles Schumer and 
Lindsey Graham introduced a bill in the Senate calling for the imposition of an across-the board 
tariff on Chinese imports in an effort to reduce China's alleged “undervalued” currency 
advantage.  More recently, the Hunter-Ryan bill (currently under consideration in the House) 
calls for treating currency manipulation as a subsidy that can be remedied by WTO-compliant 
countervailing duties.  Another piece of legislation under consideration, the Davis-English bill, 
would grant the US Department of Commerce the explicit authority to apply countervailing duties 
to non-market economies, such as China.xxiv  It is perhaps useful to recall here that as part of 
China’s entry into the WTO in December 2001, other member states retained the right to impose 
special escape clause provisions on Chinese exports when producers are under threat of injury 
from rapid Chinese penetration of domestic markets.  These special provisions came into play 
recently in the aftermath of the expiration of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) on January 1 
2005, when the US and EU quickly slapped significant restraints on rapidly accelerating textile 
and clothing imports from China.  These measures, which are to remain in force until 2008, 
highlight the protectionist threat to the Chinese growth model.  While the problem is much more 
complicated than the proposers of simplistic legislative measures often let on to,xxv the probability 
of the Congress legislating protectionist measures to address trade imbalances seems to be 
growing by the day. 
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While political threats may or may not eventuate, and much in this regard depends on the balance 
of political forces, there is another natural source of protection that is becoming ominous by the 
day.  The dramatic upsurge in international oil prices is likely to act as a major exogenous shock 
to the Chinese economy.  To understand this, one has to recall that a large proportion of Chinese 
export production is based on its location in vertically integrated international production 
networks.  Thus, according to estimates derived by Koopman et al. (2008), Chinese value-added 
constitutes only up to 50 percent of the value of exports.  This proportion is even lower for 
exports by foreign-owned or foreign-invested firms, and for products such as computers and 
telecommunications devices that are considered to be technologically more sophisticated.  This 
finding -- taken together with the fact that international markets for developing country exports 
tend to be quite competitive, reducing individual countries to the role of being price takers -- 
implies that the rise in oil and associated input costs could act as a pincer in China’s case.  To 
understand how, consider a world with three countries, Mexico, China, and the US.  Suppose the 
former two export toys to the US.  For simplicity, assume that the transportations costs for 
Mexican exporters are negligibly small.  Next suppose Chinese and Mexican firms sell a toy for 
$x in the US.  A change in international oil prices raises the cost of importing inputs for the final 
assembly of those toys.  However, to the extent that China competes with Mexico in the US 
market, the Chinese firms cannot raise the final price of their good.  Instead, they have to lower 
their export price (before transportation) in order to offset the increased transportation costs.  
Thus, the oil shock acts as a double whammy, acting adversely on both the input cost and sales 
price ends.  Of course, Mexican firms would also be hurt by the increased price of imported 
inputs, but they wouldn’t be exposed to the shock from the end demand side.  Moreover, the same 
logic applies even more starkly to competition between domestic US producers and Chinese 
exporters.  In essence, the oil shock has acted as a real appreciation of the renminbi.  If high oil 
prices are here to stay, therefore, these present a significant threat to the Chinese growth 
model.xxvi
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 7. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has explored the sustainability of China’s growth pattern.  We discuss the evolution of 
the Chinese economy, comparing it to other countries in the region that experienced sustained 
episodes of rapid growth, increased investment and savings, and rising exports in the past.  Using 
a Kaleckian framework, we analyzed some of the macroeconomic aspects of investment- and 
export-led growth, both in terms of the changes in the structure of domestic output and 
expenditures that facilitate it and the distributional shifts that, in turn, ease the path to those 
changes.  We combined this macroeconomic analysis with a look at some trade-related 
microeconomic distributional issues, analyzing how developments in recent decades may have 
counteracted the benign (equalizing) tendencies that trade theory predicts trade liberalization 
would create in a skill and capital scarce developing economy.  Our attention then turned to some 
of the other pitfalls that have arisen from the kinds of policies such as reserve accumulation, 
sterilization, and rapid liquidity creation that have accompanied effective pursuit of export-led 
growth.  One consequence of these developments has been the rising threat of protectionism 
originating from China’s main export destinations.  Another has been much increased 
vulnerability to exogenous shocks (such as the recent dramatic increase in oil prices which is, 
ironically enough, itself partially a manifestation of rapidly rising Chinese demand for oil) that 
noticeably neutralize key elements of China’s growth strategy, leaving it exposed to unforeseen 
setbacks.  Our main conclusion is that the current growth strategy may have largely outlived its 
utility, on both economic and socio-political grounds, and an effective change of course appears 
to be highly desirable.  
We end by pointing out that while the sustainability of its current growth patterns may be creating 
concerns from a narrow Chinese perspective, there exists an even larger issue from the 
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perspective of the developing world at large.  If a group of countries simultaneously pursue 
growth based on expanding exports to industrialized countries, then, in the presence of limited 
growth on the demand side, this creates a possible fallacy of composition or adding-up constraint. 
Considering China’s exceptionally successful pursuit of an export-based strategy and its large 
size, this has implications for countries attempting to emulate China.  Given our focus on Chinese 
domestic considerations, however, this paper ignores this increasingly important aspect of the 
global economy. 
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Endnotes 
i For example, Ravallion and Chen (2007) report that in the 20 years after 1981, the proportion of the 
population living in poverty fell from 53 per cent to 8 per cent, although half the decline in this percentage 
came in the early half of the 1980s.  The poverty line used here are an income of 850 yuan per person per 
year for rural areas and 1,200 yuan per person per year for urban areas, both in 2002 prices.  The aggregate 
poverty index is a population-weighted average of the indexes for rural and urban areas. 
ii See, for example, Gittings (2005) for an extensive discussion. 
iii The contribution is expected to have been even higher in 2007. 
iv The US remains China’s largest export market, the share of exports destined for the US having increased 
from about 9 percent to 21 percent between and 1984 and 2006.  Partly due to the depreciation of the dollar 
relative to the euro, however, Chinese exports to the European Union have grown at a much faster pace in 
recent years. 
v If we were to define national income in the form of GDP instead of GNP, the corresponding identities will 
be: 
Y ≡ C + I + G + TB, and TB = (T – G) + (S – I). 
vi The World Bank’s World Development Indicators database does not contain data for Taiwan, which 
explains its absence from the figures. 
vii See also Li (2006). 
viii Although this is a somewhat extreme assumption, it captures the empirically observed higher savings 
rates out of profit earnings.  Assuming positive but lower savings out of wages does not change our 
analysis qualitatively. 
ix Notice that this is somewhat different from the typical Kaleckian exposition in which the variables are 
expressed as a proportion of the total capital stock instead of national income.  Since we do not focus on 
issues related to capacity utilization here, our approach is more in line with the objectives of our discussion.   
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x Note that this assumes that investment is relatively independent of savings, and is determined by a host of 
factors including investors’ “animal spirits,” expectations of future profits, etc.  If we were to take the 
classical loanable funds approach, or alternatively, if we were to assume that investment always equals 
savings ex-ante, and/or if aggregate demand were very sensitive to investment, then we could have a 
regime of “profit-led” growth that depends on high capitalist savings as the major source of domestic 
demand.  Given the high proportion of investment in China, some may argue that its economy now operates 
under a profit-led growth regime rather than a wage-led one. 
xi See Figure 5.  See also Kim and Kuijs (2007). 
xii Although, as noted elsewhere in this section, the movement of labor in recent years has been more 
towards services than manufacturing. The primary sector usually consists of agriculture, forestry, and 
mining, the secondary sector consists of manufacturing and construction, while the tertiary sector consists 
of retail trade, financial services, utility provision, and other categories of services. 
xiii This number further declined to 44 per cent in 2002, according to the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators Online. 
xiv According to their estimates, since growth in the primary sector (primarily agriculture) did more to 
reduce poverty and inequality in China than either the secondary or tertiary sectors, starting in 1981 if the 
same aggregate growth rate had been balanced across sectors, it would have taken 10 years to bring the 
poverty rate down to 8%, rather than 20 years. 
xv They attribute the latter observation to the still existent prohibitions on inter-provincial movement of 
labor in China.  See also Yang (1999). 
xvi The reader is referred to any standard international trade textbook for a list of these assumptions. 
xvii This also happens to be true for a number of other developing countries.  See Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2007) for a comprehensive survey. 
xviii See Overman (1995) for an overview of China’s privatization plans. 
xix Indeed, in spite of all the hype over China’s booming manufactured exports, Banister (2005) finds that 
manufacturing employment actually declined between 1995 and 2002.  At least some of this is likely to be 
due to increased informal employment which does not show up in official statistics. 
xx See, for example, Ouyang et al. (2007). 
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xxi Note that China has run both a current account and a capital account surplus in recent years. This of 
course, is offset by the official reserve transactions of the People’s Bank. 
xxii As the Chinese central bank sells bonds to neutralize the effects of reserve accumulation on the 
monetary base, this increases the relative supply of Chinese bonds on the market, and should have the 
effect of raising the interest rate on Chinese offerings.  This `portfolio balance’’ effect, although hard t o 
empirically detect, seems to be present when developing countries offer sterilization bonds on the market.  
Since much of the banking system in China is still under state control, however, the sale of sterilization 
bonds appears to have had negligible effects on interest rates. 
xxiii Indeed, Premier Wen Jiabao recently highlighted this concern when he told a business audience in 
Singapore that ``we are worried about how to preserve the value of our reserves,” and that “we have never 
been experiencing such big pressure.” (Dickie et al., 2007). 
xxiv The US Department of Commerce has had a long-standing practice of not applying countervailing 
duties on products exported from so-called “non-market economies” on the grounds that it is not possible to 
accurately evaluate the free market price of goods exported by such economies.  The duty imposed on 
Chinese glossy paper in early 2007 was a major departure in this regard. 
xxv For example, the imposition of tariffs on Chinese exports, or the successful culmination of efforts to get 
the Chinese to revalue their currency – a revaluation acts simultaneously as an import tariff and an export 
subsidy – is likely to displace exports from China to other cheap labor countries such as Vietnam. 
xxvi Indeed, in a story for the Wall Street Journal, Aeppel (2008) reports that a number of companies are 
already moving production and purchases back to the US.  DESA LLC, for example, reported that the 15% 
increase in the cost of shipping goods from China contributed to its decision to produce more in Kentucky.  
Also, see Rubin and Tal (2008) for an interesting analysis of the China, Mexico, and US case. 
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